This paper introduces the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). In contrast to traditional public key cryptographic systems, CL-PKC does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. It does rely on the use of a trusted third party (TTP) who is in possession of a master key. In these respects, CL-PKC is similar to identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). On the other hand, CL-PKC does not suffer from the key escrow property that seems to be inherent in ID-PKC. Thus CL-PKC can be seen as a model for the use of public key cryptography that is intermediate between traditional certificated PKC and ID-PKC.
Introduction
The main difficulty today in developing secure systems based on public key cryptography is not the problem of choosing appropriately secure algorithms or implementing those algorithms. Rather, it is the deployment and management of infrastructures to support the authenticity of cryptographic keys: there is a need to provide an assurance to the user about the relationship between a public key and the identity (or authority) of the holder of the corresponding private key. In a traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), this assurance is delivered in the form of certificate, essentially a signature by a Certification Authority (CA) on a public key [1] . The problems of PKI technology are well documented, see for example [22] . Of note are the issues associated with certificate management, including revocation, storage and distribution and the computational cost of certificate verification. These are particularly acute in processor or bandwidth-limited environments [13] .
Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), first proposed by Shamir [32] , tackles the problem of authenticity of keys in a different way to traditional PKI. In ID-PKC, an entity's public key is derived directly from certain aspects of its identity, for example, an IP address belonging to a network host, or an e-mail address associated with a user. Private keys are generated for entities by a trusted third party called a private key generator (PKG). The first fully practical and secure identity-based public key encryption scheme was presented in [6] . Since then, a rapid development of ID-PKC has taken place. There now exist identity-based key exchange protocols (interactive [31] as well as non-interactive [33] ), signature schemes [10, 23, 26] , hierarchical schemes [20] and a host of other primitives. It has also been illustrated in [11, 25, 34] how ID-PKC can be used as a tool to enforce what might be termed "cryptographic work-flows", that is, sequences of operations (e.g. authentications) that need to be performed by an entity in order to achieve a certain goal.
The direct derivation of public keys in ID-PKC eliminates the need for certificates and some of the problems associated with them. On the other hand, the dependence on a PKG who uses a system-wide master key to generate private keys inevitably introduces key escrow to ID-PKC systems. For example, the PKG can decrypt any ciphertext in an identity-based public key encryption scheme. Equally problematical, the PKG could forge any entity's signatures in an identity-based signature scheme, so ID-PKC cannot offer true non-repudiation in the way that traditional PKI can. The escrow problem can be solved to a certain extent by the introduction of multiple PKGs and the use of threshold techniques, but this necessarily involves extra communication and infrastructure. Moreover, the compromise of the PKG's master key could be disastrous in an ID-PKC system, and usually more severe than the compromise of a CA's signing key in a traditional PKI. For these reasons, it seems that the use of ID-PKC may be restricted to small, closed groups or to applications with limited security requirements.
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography
In this paper, we introduce a new paradigm for public key cryptography, which we name certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). Our concept grew out of a search for public key schemes that do not require the use of certificates and yet do not have the built-in key escrow feature of ID-PKC. The solution we propose enjoys both of these properties; in this way, it is a model for the use of public key cryptography that is intermediate between traditional PKI and ID-PKC. Our concept shares some features in common with the self-certificated keys of [21, 27] and with Gentry's recently proposed certificate-based encryption [19] .
We demonstrate that our concept of CL-PKC can be made real by specifying certificateless encryption, signature and key exchange schemes. We prove that the encryption scheme is secure in a new and appropriate model, given the hardness of an underlying computational problem. We also demonstrate how certificateless hierarchical schemes can be supported. Our certificateless schemes are all built from bilinear maps on groups. In practice these will be implemented using Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves, and the security will rest on a computational problem related to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP).
Defining CL-PKC
We sketch the defining characteristics of CL-PKC.
A CL-PKC system still makes use of TTP which we name the key generating centre (KGC). By way of contrast to the PKG in ID-PKC, this KGC does not have access to entities' private keys. Instead, the KGC supplies an entity A with a partial private key D A which the KGC computes from an identifer ID A for the entity and a master key. Note that we will often equate A with its identifier ID A . The process of supplying partial private keys should take place confidentially and authentically: the KGC must ensure that the partial private keys are delivered securely to the correct entities. Identifiers can be arbitrary strings.
The entity A then combines its partial private key D A with some secret information to generate its actual private key S A . In this way, A's private key is not available to the KGC. The entity A also combines its secret information with the KGC's public parameters to compute its public key P A . Note that A need not be in possession of S A before generating P A : all that is needed to generate both is the same secret information. The system is not identity-based, because the public key is no longer computable from an identity (or identifier) alone. Entity A's public key might be made available to other entities by transmitting it along with messages (for example, in a signing application) or by placing it in a public directory (this would be more appropriate for an encryption setting). But no further security is applied to the protection of A's public key. In particular, there is no certificate for A's key. To encrypt a message to A or verify a signature from A, entity B makes use of P A and ID A . A more formal model for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) will be given in Section 3. Much of this model is also applicable for our other certificateless primitives.
An Adversarial Model for CL-PKC
Because of the lack of authenticating information for public keys (in the form of a certificate, for example), we must assume that an adversary can replace A's public key by a false key of its choice. This might seem to give the adversary tremendous power and to be disastrous for CL-PKC. However, we will see that an active adversary who attacks in this way gains nothing useful: without the correct private key, whose production requires the partial private key and therefore the cooperation of the KGC, an adversary will not be able to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under the false public key, produce signatures that verify with the false public key, and so on. (Formally, in the encryption setting, the adversary will not be able to distinguish the encryptions of distinct messages of his choice.)
Of course, we must assume that the KGC does not mount an attack of this type: armed with the partial private key and the ability to replace public keys, the KGC could impersonate any entity in generating a private/public key pair and then making the public key available. Thus we must assume that, while the KGC is in possession of the master key and hence all partial private keys, it is trusted not to replace entities' public keys. However, we assume that the KGC might engage in other adversarial activity, eavesdropping on ciphertexts and making decryption queries, for example. In this way, users invest roughly the same level of trust in the KGC as they would in a CA in a traditional PKI -it is rarely made explicit, but such a CA is always assumed not to issue new certificates binding arbitrary public keys and entity combinations of its choice, and especially not for those where it knows the corresponding private key! When compared to ID-PKC, the trust assumptions made of the trusted third party in CL-PKC are much reduced: in ID-PKC, users must trust the PKG not to abuse its knowledge of private keys in performing passive attacks, while in CL-PKC, users need only trust the KGC not to actively propagate false public keys.
The word roughly here merits further explanation. In a traditional PKI, if the CA forges certificates, then the CA can be identified as having misbehaved through the existence of two valid certificates for the same identity. This is not the case in our schemes: a new public key could have been created by the legitimate user or by the KGC, and it cannot be easily decided which is the case. The terminology of [21] is useful here: our schemes achieve trust level 2, whereas a traditional PKI reaches trust level 3. However, we can further strengthen security against a malicious KGC in our schemes by allowing entities to choose identifiers ID A which bind together their public keys and identities. Now the existence of two different, working public keys for the same identity will identify the KGC as having misbehaved in issuing both corresponding partial private keys. Details of this modification can be found in Section 5.1. With this binding in place, our schemes do reach trust level 3.
In Section 3, we will present an adversarial model for CL-PKE which captures these capabilities in a formal way. The model we present there is a natural generalization of the fully adaptive, multi-user model of [6] to the CL-PKC setting, and involves two distinct types of adversary: one who can replace public keys at will and another who has knowledge of the master key but does not replace public keys. Given our detailed development of this model, the adaptations to existing models that are needed to produce adversarial models for our other certificateless primitives become straightforward.
Implementation and Applications of CL-PKC
Our presentation of CL-PKC schemes will be at a fairly abstract level, in terms of bilinear maps on groups. However, the concrete realization of these schemes using pairings on elliptic curves is now becoming comparatively routine, after the work of [2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17, 18] on implementation of pairings and selection of curves with suitable properties. All the schemes we present use a small number of pairing calculations for each cryptographic operation, and some of these can usually be eliminated when repeated operations involving the same identities take place. Public and private keys are small in size: two elliptic curve points for the public key and one for the private key.
The infrastructure needed to support CL-PKC is lightweight when compared to a traditional PKI. This is because, just as with ID-PKC, the need to manage certificates is completely eliminated. This immediately makes CL-PKC attractive for low-bandwidth, low-power situations, for example, mobile security applications, where the need to transmit and check certificates has been identified as a significant limitation [13] . However, it should be pointed out that recently introduced signatures schemes enjoying very short signatures [9] could be used to significantly decrease the size of certificates and create a lightweight PKI. Our CL-PKC signature scheme can also support true non-repudiation, because private keys remain in the sole possession of their legitimate owners.
Revocation of keys in CL-PKC systems can be handled in the same way as in ID-PKC systems. In [6] the idea of appending validity periods to identifiers ID A is given as one convenient solution. In the context of CL-PKC, this ensures that any partial private key, and hence any private key, has a limited shelf-life.
As will become apparent, our CL-PKC schemes are actually very closely related to existing pairing-based ID-PKC schemes. One consequence of this is that any infrastructure deployed to support pairing-based ID-PKC (e.g. a PKG) can also be used to support our CL-PKC schemes too: in short, the two types of scheme can peacefully co-exist. In fact, an entity can be granted a private key for a pairing-based ID-PKC scheme and immediately convert it into a private key for our CL-PKC scheme. In this way, an entity who wishes to prevent the PKG exploiting the escrow property of an identity-based system can do so, though at the cost of losing the identity-based nature of its public key.
Although our CL-PKC schemes are no longer identity-based, they do enjoy the property that an entity's private key can be determined after its public key has been generated and used. This is a useful feature. An entity B can encrypt a message for A using A's chosen public key and an identifier ID A of B's choice. This identifier should contain A's identity but might also contain a condition that A must demonstrate that it satisfies before the KGC will deliver the corresponding partial private key (which in turn allows A to compute the right private key for decryption). For example, this condition might be that A has a valid driver's licence. The encrypted message then might be A's new insurance document. In this way, B can create a "cryptographic work-flow" that A must carry out before being able to access some information. This kind of application cannot be easily supported using certificate-based systems, because in those systems, the temporal ordering of private key before public key and certificate is fixed. For more applications of work-flows, see [25, 34] .
Related Work
Our work on CL-PKC owes much to the pioneering work of Boneh and Franklin [6, 7] on identity-based public key encryption. In fact, our CL-PKE scheme is derived from the scheme of [6] by making a very simple modification (albeit, one with far-reaching consequences). Our security proofs require significant changes and new ideas to handle our new types of adversary. Likewise, our signature, key exchange and hierarchical schemes also arise by adapting existing ID-PKC schemes.
Another alternative to traditional certificate-based PKI called self-certified keys was introduced by Girault [21] and further developed in [27, 29] . The schemes presented in [21, 27, 29] are structurally somewhat similar to our CL-PKC schemes. In a self-certified scheme, an entity chooses its private key x and corresponding public key y and delivers y to a TTP. The TTP combines y with the identity ID of that entity to produce a witness w. This witness may just be the TTP's signature on some combination of y and ID as in [21] , part of a signature as in [27] , or the result of inverting a trapdoor one-way function based on y and ID [29] . Given w, ID and the TTP's public key, any party can extract y, while only the TTP can produce the witness w from y and ID. The schemes offer implicit certification, in that the authenticity of a public key is verified implicitly through the subsequent use of the correct private key.
As in CL-PKC, self-certified keys enable the use of public key cryptography without traditional certificates. However, it can be argued that the witness in a self-certified scheme is really just a lightweight certificate linking ID and y. Our CL-PKC schemes do not have such witnesses. The self-certified schemes have an advantage over our level 2 CL-PKC schemes in that the communication between an entity and the TTP need not be confidential: there are no partial private keys to be transported to entities. On the other hand, the private key needs to be chosen before the public key can be generated (unlike CL-PKC and ID-PKC schemes), so the elegant applications of CL-PKC to controlling work-flows cannot be realized in selfcertified systems. Nor do the self-certified schemes enjoy security proofs. Indeed Saeednia [30] has recently pointed out a basic flaw in the scheme of [21] which allows a cheating TTP to extract an entity's private key; the consequence is that far larger (and less efficient) parameters are needed to create a secure scheme.
Recent work of Gentry [19] exploits pairings to simplify certificate revocation in traditional PKI systems. In Gentry's model, an entity B's private key consists of two components: a first component which that entity chooses for itself and keeps private, and a component which is time-dependent and is issued to B on a regular basis by a CA. Matching the two private key components are two public key components. The first of these is chosen by B's while the second can be computed by A using only some public parameters of the scheme's CA together with the current time value and the assumed value of B's public key. Because of the structure of the CBE scheme, A is then assured that B can only decrypt if he is in possession of both private components. Thus the second private component acts as an implicit certificate for relying parties: one that a relying party can be assured is only available to B provided that B's certification has been issued for the current time period by the CA. This approach provides an implicit revocation mechanism for PKIs: notice that there is no need for A to make any status checks on B's public key before encrypting a message for B; rather A's assurance that only B can decrypt comes through trusting the CA to properly update and distribute the second components of private keys.
Gentry's scheme is presented in the context of a traditional PKI model, whereas our work departs from the traditional PKI and ID-PKC models to present a new paradigm for the use of public-key cryptography. However, the two models are conceptually rather similar: both make use of keys that are composed of two parts, one chosen by an entity for itself and the other coming from a trusted authority. In fact, it is possible to modify Gentry's work to divorce it from the setting of a traditional PKI. In the reverse direction, we can modify our scheme to provide CBE functionality by the simple expedient of including expiry information and public keys in identity strings. The details of these modifications are beyond the scope of this paper.
Thus the two models, developed independently 1 , are closely related. However, there do remain major differences: our security model assumes an adversary who can extract partial private keys and change public keys even for the challenge identity, whereas Gentry's model, in which the equivalent of partial private keys are already public and bind the public keys to identities, models the adversary slightly differently. Gentry's model requires an adversary to give private keys to the simulator (a rather unusual requirement, though one that can be removed for the specific scheme in [19] ). We circumvent this requirement by extending the concept of knowledge extraction to the situation with multiple public keys under the control of the adversary. Moreover, the concrete realizations of the two models are different.
Overview of the Paper
Throughout the paper, we focus mostly on certificateless public key encryption for the sake of brevity. Section 2 gives some background definitions for bilinear maps and associated computational problems that we need. In Section 3, we define in detail the notion of a certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme, giving a formal model for the capabilities of adversaries and a definition of security. Then in Section 4, we give a concrete CL-PKE scheme and state our result about its security; this result is proved in the appendix. After this, Section 5 sketches certificateless signature, authenticated key exchange and hierarchical schemes. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background Definitions
Throughout the paper, G 1 denotes an additive group of prime order q and G 2 a multiplicative group of the same order. We let P denote a generator of G 1 . For us, a pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
1. The map e is bilinear: given Q, W, Z ∈ G 1 , we have e(Q, W + Z) = e(Q, W ) · e(Q, Z) and e(Q + W, Z) = e(Q, Z) · e(W, Z).
Consequently, for any a, b ∈ Z q , we have e(aQ, bW ) = e(Q, W ) ab = e(abQ, W ) etc.
2.
The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1 G 2 .
3. The map e is efficiently computable.
Typically, the map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. We refer to [2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17, 18] for a more comprehensive description of how these groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected in practice for efficiency and security. We note that all our schemes can be adapted to the situation where two different groups are involved on the left-hand side of the pairing map. This increases the range of curves over which our schemes can be realised.
We also introduce here the computational problems that will form the basis of security for our CL-PKC schemes.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): Let G 1 , G 2 , P and e be as above. The BDHP in G 1 , G 2 , e is as follows: Given P, aP, bP, cP with uniformly random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z * q , compute e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 . An algorithm A has advantage ǫ in solving the BDHP in G 1 , G 2 , e if Pr A( P, aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P ) abc = ǫ.
Here the probability is measured over the random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z * q and the random bits of A.
Generalized Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP): Let G 1 , G 2 , P and e be as above. The GBDHP in G 1 , G 2 , e is as follows: Given P, aP, bP, cP with uniformly random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z * q , output a pair Q ∈ G * 1 , e(P, Q) abc ∈ G 2 . An algorithm A has advantage ǫ in solving the GBDHP in G 1 , G 2 , e if Pr A( P, aP, bP, cP ) = Q, e(P, Q)
Notice that the BDHP is a special case of the GBDHP in which the algorithm outputs the choice Q = P . While the GBDHP may appear to be in general easier to solve than the BDHP because the solver gets to choose Q, we know of no polynomial-time algorithm for solving either when the groups G 1 , G 2 and pairing e are appropriately selected. If the solver knows s ∈ Z * q such that Q = sP , then the problems are of course equivalent. The GBDHP is related to generalized versions of the computational Diffie-Hellman problems in G 1 and G 2 in the same way that the BDHP is related to the standard computational Diffie-Hellman problem in those groups [6, 17] .
BDH Parameter Generator: As in [6] , a randomized algorithm IG is a BDH parameter generator if IG: (1) takes security parameter k ≥ 1, (2) runs in polynomial time in k, and (3) outputs the description of groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q and a pairing e :
Our security proofs will yield reductions to the BDHP or GBDHP in groups generated by a BDH parameter generator IG. To make statements about the security of our schemes, we will assume that there is no polynomial time algorithm with a non-negligible (in k) advantage in solving the BDHP or GBDHP in groups generated by IG. Our reductions to BDHP and GBDHP can be made concrete.
Certificateless Public Key Encryption
In this section we present a formal definition for a certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme. We also examine the capabilities which may be possessed by the adversaries against such a scheme and give a security model for CL-PKE.
A CL-PKE scheme is specified by seven randomized algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Encrypt and Decrypt:
Setup: This algorithm takes security parameter k and returns the system parameters params and master-key. The system parameters includes a description of the message space M and ciphertext space C. Usually, this algorithm is run by the KGC. We assume throughout that params are publicly and authentically available, but that only the KGC knows master-key.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes params, master-key and an identifier for entity A, ID A ∈ {0, 1} * , as input. It returns a partial private key D A . Usually this algorithm is run by the KGC and its output is transported to entity A over a confidential and authentic channel. Set-Public-Key: This algorithm takes params and entity A's secret value x A as input and from these constructs the public key P A for entity A.
Set
Normally both Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key are run by an entity A for itself, after running Set-Secret-Value. The same secret value x A is used in each. Separating them makes it clear that there is no need for a temporal ordering on the generation of public and private keys in our CL-PKE scheme. Usually, A is the only entity in possession of S A and x A , and x A will be chosen at random from a suitable and large set.
Encrypt: This algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M ∈ M, and the public key P A and identifier ID A of an entity A. It returns either a ciphertext C ∈ C or the null symbol ⊥ indicating an encryption failure. This will always occur in the event that P A does not have the correct form. In our scheme, this is the only way an encryption failure will occur.
Decrypt: This algorithm takes as inputs params, C ∈ C, and a private key S A . It returns a message M ∈ M or a message ⊥ indicating a decryption failure.
Naturally, we insist that output M should result from applying algorithm Decrypt with inputs params, S A on a ciphertext C generated by using algorithm Encrypt with inputs params, P A , ID A on message M .
Security model for CL-PKE
Given this formal definition of a CL-PKE scheme, we are now in a position to define adversaries for such a scheme. The standard definition for security for a public key encryption scheme involves indistinguishability of encryptions against a fully-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacker (IND-CCA) [4, 14, 28] . In this definition, there are two parties, the adversary A and the challenger C. The adversary operates in three phases after being presented with a random public key. In Phase 1, A may make decryption queries on ciphertexts of its choice. In the Challenge Phase, A chooses two messages M 0 , M 1 and is given a challenge ciphertext C * for one of these two messages M b by the challenger. In Phase 2, A may make further decryption queries, but may not ask for the decryption of C * . The attack ends with A's guess b ′ for the bit b. The adversary's advantage is defined to be Adv
2 ). This model was strengthened for ID-PKC in [6] to handle adversaries who can extract the private keys of arbitrary entities and who choose the identity ID ch of the entity on whose public key they are challenged. This extension is appropriate because the compromise of some entities' private keys should not affect the security of an uncompromised entity's encryptions.
Here, we extend the model of [6] to allow adversaries who can extract partial private keys, or private keys, or both, for identities of their choice. Given that our scheme has no certificates, we must further strengthen the model to allow for adversaries who can replace the public key of any entity with a value of their choice. We must also consider carefully how a challenger should respond to key extraction and decryption queries for identities whose public keys have been changed.
Here then is a list of the actions that a general adversary against a CL-PKE scheme may carry out and a discussion of each action.
Extract partial private key of A: C responds by running algorithm
Partial-Private-Key-Extract to generate the partial private key D A for entity A.
2. Extract private key for A: As in [6] , we allow our adversary A to make requests for entities' private keys. If A's public key has not been replaced then C can respond by running algorithm Set-Private-Key to generate the private key S A for entity A (first running Set-Secret-Value for A if necessary). But it is unreasonable to expect C to be able to respond to such a query if A has already replaced A's public key. Also as in [6] , we insist that A does not at any point extract the private key for the selected challenge identity ID ch .
3. Request public key of A: Naturally, we assume that public keys are available to A. On receiving a first request for A's public key, C responds by running algorithm Set-Public-Key to generate the public key P A for entity A (first running Set-Secret-Value for A if necessary).
Replace public key of A:
A can repeatedly replace the public key P A for any entity A with any value P ′ A of its choice. In our concrete CL-PKE schemes, our public keys will have a certain structure that is used to test the validity of public keys before any encryption. We assume here that the adversary's choice P ′ A is a valid public key; this assumption can be removed (and our schemes remain secure) at the cost of some additional complexity in our definitions. Note that in our schemes, any entity can easily create public keys that are valid. The current value of an entity's public key is used by C in any computations (for example, preparing a challenge ciphertext) or responses to A's requests (for example, replying to a request for the public key). We insist that A cannot both replace the public key for the challenge identity ID ch before the challenge phase and extract the partial private key for ID ch in some phase -this would enable A to receive a challenge ciphertext under a public key for which it could compute the private key.
5. Decryption query for ciphertext C and entity A: If A has not replaced the public key of entity A, then C responds by running the algorithm Set-Private-Key to obtain the private key S A , then running Decrypt on ciphertext C and private key S A and returning the output to A. However, if A has already replaced the public key of A, then in following this approach, C will (in general) not decrypt using a private key matching the current public key. So C's reply to A's decryption query is likely to be incorrect. Indeed C most likely will not even know what the private key matching the current public key is! In defining our security model for CL-PKE, we have two options: we could simply accept that these decryptions will be incorrect, or we can insist that C should somehow properly decrypt ciphertexts even for entities whose public keys have been replaced. The former option could be argued for on grounds of reasonableness: after all, how can C be expected to provide correct decryptions when A gets to choose the public key? On the other hand, the latter option results in a more powerful security model, because now decryption queries made under public keys that have been changed will potentially be far more useful to A. For this reason, we adopt the latter option for our model, even though it substantially complicates our proofs of security. (These decryptions will be handled using special purpose knowledge extractors in our security proofs.) Naturally, as in [6] , we prohibit A from ever making a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C * for the combination of identity ID ch and public key P ch that was used to encrypt M b . However A is, for example, allowed to replace the public key for ID ch with a new value and then request a decryption of C * , or to change another entity A's public key to P ch (or any other value) and then request the decryption of C * for entity A.
We also want to consider adversaries who are equipped with master-key, in order to model security against an eavesdropping KGC. As discussed in Section 1, we do not allow such an adversary to replace public keys: in this respect, we invest in the KGC the same level of trust as we do in a CA in a traditional PKI. So we will distinguish between two adversary types, with slightly different capabilities:
CL-PKE Type I Adversary: Such an adversary A I does not have access to master-key. However, A I may request public keys and replace public keys with values of its choice, extract partial private and private keys and make decryption queries, all for identities of its choice. As discussed above, we make several natural restrictions on such a Type I adversary:
1. A I cannot extract the private key for ID ch at any point.
2.
A I cannot request the private key for any identity if the corresponding public key has already been replaced.
3.
A I cannot both replace the public key for the challenge identity ID ch before the challenge phase and extract the partial private key for ID ch in some phase.
4. In Phase 2, A I cannot make a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C * for the combination of identity ID ch and public key P ch that was used to encrypt M b .
CL-PKE Type II Adversary: Such an adversary A II does have access to master-key, but may not replace public keys of entities. Adversary A II can compute partial private keys for itself, given master-key. It can also request public keys, make private key extraction queries and decryption queries, both for identities of its choice. The restrictions on this type of adversary are:
1. A II cannot replace public keys at any point.
2.
A II cannot extract the private key for ID ch at any point.
3. In Phase 2, A II cannot make a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C * for the combination of identity ID ch and public key P ch that was used to encrypt M b .
Chosen ciphertext security for CL-PKE: We say that a CL-PKE scheme is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack ("IND-CCA secure") if no polynomially bounded adversary A of Type I or Type II has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:
The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives A the resulting system parameters params. If A is of Type I, then the challenger keeps master-key to itself, otherwise, it gives master-key to A.
Phase 1:
A issues a sequence of requests, each request being either a partial private key extraction, a private key extraction, a request for a public key, a replace public key command or a decryption query for a particular entity. These queries may be asked adaptively, but are subject to the rules on adversary behaviour defined above.
Challenge Phase: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs the challenge identity ID ch and two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 ∈ M. Again, the adversarial constraints given above apply. In particular, ID ch cannot be an identity for which the private key has been extracted. Moreover, if A is of Type I, then ID ch cannot be an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key extracted. The challenger now picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes C * , the encryption of M b under the current public key P ch for ID ch . If the output of the encryption is ⊥ , then A has immediately lost the game (it has replaced a public key with one not having the correct form). Otherwise, C * is delivered to A.
Phase 2:
A issues a second sequence of requests as in Phase 1, again subject to the rules on adversary behaviour above. In particular, no private key extraction on ID ch is allowed, and, if A is of Type I, then the partial private key for ID ch cannot be extracted if the corresponding public key was replaced in Phase 1. Moreover, no decryption query can be made on the challenge ciphertext C * for the combination of identity ID ch and public key P ch that was used to encrypt M b . 4. Choose cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * 1 and H 2 : G 2 → {0, 1} n . Here n will be the bit-length of plaintexts. 2 The system parameters are params= G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 . The master-key is s ∈ Z * q . The message space is M = {0, 1} n and the ciphertext space is C = G 1 × {0, 1} n . Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes as input an identifier ID A ∈ {0, 1} * , and carries out the following steps to construct the partial private key for entity A with identifier ID A :
Output the partial private key D
The reader will notice that the partial private key of entity A here is identical to that entity's private key in the schemes of [6] . Also notice that A can verify the correctness of the Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm output by checking e(D A , P ) = e(Q A , P 0 ).
Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm takes as inputs params and an entity A's identifier ID A as inputs. It selects x A ∈ Z * q at random and outputs x A as A's secret value. Set-Private-Key: This algorithm takes as inputs params, an entity A's partial private key D A and A's secret value x A ∈ Z * q . It transforms partial private key D A to private key S A by computing
This algorithm takes params and entity A's secret value x A ∈ Z * q as inputs and constructs A's public key as P A = X A , Y A , where X A = x A P and Y A = x A P 0 = x A sP .
Encrypt: To encrypt M ∈ M for entity A with identifier ID A ∈ {0, 1} * and public key P A = X A , Y A , perform the following steps:
1. Check that X A , Y A ∈ G * 1 and that the equality e(X A , P 0 ) = e(Y A , P ) holds. If not, output ⊥ and abort encryption.
Compute
3. Choose a random value r ∈ Z * q .
Compute and output the ciphertext:
Notice that this encryption operation is identical to the encryption algorithm in the scheme BasicIdent of [6] , except for the check on the structure of the public key in step 1 and the use of Y A in place of P 0 = P pub in step 4.
Decrypt: Suppose C = U, V ∈ C. To decrypt this ciphertext using the private key S A , compute and output:
V ⊕ H 2 (e(S A , U )).
Notice that if U = rP, V is the encryption of M for entity A with public key P A = X A , Y A , then we have:
so that decryption is the inverse of encryption. Again, the similarity to the decryption operation of BasicIdent should be apparent.
We have presented this scheme to help the reader understand our FullCL-PKE scheme, and so we do not analyse its security in detail. It can be shown that BasicCL-PKE is secure in a One-Way Encryption (OWE) model, in which Type I and II adversaries have the same capabilities regarding public and private keys as in our fully adaptive model in Section 3, but where they do not make decryption queries, and where the challenge to the adversary is simply to decrypt a challenge ciphertext. The security relies on the hardness of the GBDHP and assumes H 1 and H 2 are random oracles. In essence, the detailed analysis shows that security against Type II adversaries can be reduced to the difficulty of computing the value e(Q A , x A sP ) r . Because a Type II adversary has s but not x A , this is equivalent to the BDHP on input P, Q A , U, X A . Likewise, security against a Type I adversary who does not know s but who might replace Y A by a new value Y ′ A can be reduced to the GBDHP on input P, Q A = aP, U = rP, P 0 = sP , with solution Y ′ A , e(P, Y ′ A ) sra . We omit the details.
A Full CL-PKE Scheme
Now that we have described our basic CL-PKE scheme, we add chosen ciphertext security to it, adapting the Fujisaki-Okamoto padding technique [16] . The algorithms for FullCL-PKE are as follows:
Setup: Identical to Setup for BasicCL-PKE, except that we choose two additional cryptographic hash functions H 3 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → Z * q and H 4 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Now the system parameters are params= G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . The master-key and message space M are the same as in BasicCL-PKE. The ciphertext space is now C = G 1 × {0, 1} 2n .
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: Identical to BasicCL-PKE.
Set-Secret-Value: Identical to BasicCL-PKE.
Set-Private-Key: Identical to BasicCL-PKE.
Set-Public-Key: Identical to BasicCL-PKE.
Compute
3. Choose a random σ ∈ {0, 1} n .
5. Compute and output the ciphertext:
Decrypt: Suppose C = U, V, W ∈ C. To decrypt this ciphertext using the private key S A :
If not, output ⊥ and reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M ′ as the decryption of C.
When C is a valid encryption of M using P A and ID A , it is easy to see that decrypting C will result in an output M ′ = M . We note that W can be replaced by W = E H 4 (σ) (M ) where E denotes a semantically secure symmetric key encryption scheme as in [16] (though our security proofs will require some modifications to handle this case). This concludes the description of FullCL-PKE.
Security of the scheme FullCL-PKE
We have the following theorem about the security of FullCL-PKE. Theorem 1 Let hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 be random oracles. Suppose further that there is no polynomially bounded algorithm that can solve the GBDHP in groups generated by IG with non-negligible advantage. Then FullCL-PKE is IND-CCA secure.
This theorem follows from a sequence of lemmas that are proved in the appendices. It can be made into a concrete security reduction relating the advantage ǫ of a Type I or Type II attacker against FullCL-PKE to that of an algorithm to solve GBDHP or BDHP. We omit the rather unaesthetic expressions which result.
The proof strategy for Theorem 1 is in two parts, depending on the type of the adversary.
For a Type II adversary, we first show that the security of FullCL-PKE can be reduced to the security of a related (normal) public key encryption scheme HybridPub in the usual IND-CCA model. We then use the results of [16] to reduce the security of HybridPub to that of a second public key encryption scheme BasicPub against OWE adversaries. Finally, we are able to relate the security of BasicPub to the hardness of the BDHP.
The proof of Theorem 1 for a Type I attacker is significantly more complicated. Essentially, this is because we have to handle the possibility that a Type I adversary may extract partial private keys as well as replace public keys. The replacement of public keys complicates the handling of decryption queries. We cannot directly apply the results of [16] in this situation; instead we first provide a reduction relating the security of FullCL-PKE to that of HybridPub in an extended IND-CPA model in which adversaries may alter the public key presented by the challenger. This reduction makes use of special-purpose knowledge extraction algorithm to handle decryption queries. Thereafter, we reduce the security to that of BasicPub against similarly extended OWE adversaries. We are then able to relate security to the hardness of the GBDHP. For details, see the appendices.
Further CL-PKC Schemes
In this section, we sketch a number of other CL-PKC primitives: a signature scheme based on the identity-based scheme of [23] , a key exchange protocol which improves on the security offered by the schemes of [12, 33] , and hierarchical and proxy encryption schemes. We begin by outlining an alternative key generation technique which enhances the resilience of our schemes against a cheating KGC and allows for non-repudation of certificateless signatures.
An Alternative Key Generation Technique
Up to this point, we have assumed that the KGC is trusted to not replace the public keys of users and to only issue one copy of each partial private key, to the correct recipient. This may involve an unacceptable level of trust in the KGC for some users. Our current set up also allows users to create more than one public key for the same partial private key. This can be desirable in some applications, but undesirable in others.
Here we sketch a simple binding technique which ensures that users can only create one public key for which they know the corresponding private key. In our technique, an entity A must first fix its secret value x A and its public key P A = X A , Y A . We then re-define Q A to be Q A = H 1 (ID A P A ) -now Q A binds A's identifier and public key. The partial private key delivered to entity A is still D A = sQ A and the private key created by A is still xsQ A . However, these are also now bound to A's choice of public key. This binding effectively restricts A to using a single public key, since A can now only compute one private key from
This technique has a very important additional benefit: it reduces the degree of trust that users need to have in the KGC in our certificateless schemes. In short, the technique raises many of our schemes to trust level 3 in the trust hierarchy of [21] , the same level as is enjoyed in a traditional PKI.
In our original scheme, a cheating KGC could replace an entity's public key by one for which it knows the secret value without fear of being identified. We have assumed up to this point that no KGC would engage in such an action, and that users must trust the KGC not to do so. Note that this action is not equivalent to a CA forging a certificate in a traditional PKI: the existence of two valid certificates would surely implicate the CA (though the CA could perhaps revoke the entity's original certificate first). Now, with our binding technique in place, a KGC who replaces an entity's public key will be implicated in the event of a dispute: the existence of two working public keys for an identity can only result from the existence of two partial private keys binding that identity to two different public keys; only the KGC could have created these two partial private keys. Thus our binding technique makes the KGC's replacement of a public key apparent and equivalent to a CA forging a certificate in a traditional PKI. Theorem 1 still applies for our CL-PKE scheme with this binding in place because of the way in which H 1 is modelled as a random oracle. Notice too that with this binding in place, there is no longer any need to keep partial private keys secret: informally, knowledge of the key D A = sQ A does not help an adversary to create the unique private key S A = xsQ A that matches the particular public key P A that is bound to D A .
The binding technique can be applied to the primitives in this section too. For example, it ensures a stronger form of non-repudiation than is otherwise possible for our certificateless signature scheme in Section 5.2: without the binding, an entity could always repudiate a signature by producing a second working public key and claiming that the KGC had created the signature using the first public key.
Even with this binding in place, the security analysis of our original encryption scheme (in which an adversary can replace public keys) is still important: it models the scenario where an adversary temporarily replaces the public key P A of an entity A with a new value P ′ A in an attempt to obtain a ciphertext which he can distinguish, and then resets the public key. In this case, our proof shows that the adversary does not gain any advantage in a distinguishing game unless he has access to the matching partial private key D ′ A = sH 1 (ID A P ′ A ). In turn, this partial private key should not be made available by the KGC. Of course, nothing can prevent a KGC from mounting an attack of this type, but the same applies for the CA in a traditional PKI.
A Certificateless Signature Scheme
We will describe a certificateless public-key signature (CL-PKS) scheme that is based on a provably secure ID-PKC signature scheme of [23] .
In general, a CL-PKS scheme can be specified by seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Sign and Verify. These are similar to the algorithms used to define a CL-PKE scheme: Setup and params are modified to include a description of the signature space S, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key are just as before and Sign and Verify are as follows:
Sign: This algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M ∈ M to be signed and a private key S A . It outputs a signature Sig ∈ S.
Verify: This algorithm takes as inputs params, a message M ∈ M, the identifier ID A and public key P A of an entity A, and Sig ∈ S as the signature to be verified. It outputs valid, invalid or ⊥ .
Given this general description, we now outline a CL-PKS scheme:
Setup: This is identical to Setup for our scheme BasicCL-PKE, except that now there is only one hash function H : {0, 1} * × G 2 → Z * q and params is G 1 , G 2 , n, e, P, P 0 , H . The signature space is defined as S = G 1 × Z * q . Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key: Identical to BasicCL-PKE.
Sign: To sign M ∈ M using the private key S A , perform the following steps:
1. Choose random a ∈ Z * q .
2. Compute r = e(aP, P ) ∈ G 2 .
5. Output as the signature U, v .
Verify: To verify a purported signature U, v on a message M ∈ M for identity ID A and public key X A , Y A :
1. Check that the equality e(X A , P 0 ) = e(Y A , P ) holds. If not, output ⊥ and abort verification.
3. Check if v = H(M, r) holds. If it does, output valid, otherwise output invalid.
A Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
A number of identity-based two party key-agreement protocols have been described [12, 33] . All the session keys created in Smart's protocol [33] can trivially be recovered by the TA. The protocol of [33] was later modified by Chen and Kudla [12] to eliminate this escrow capability. However, the TA in the protocol of [12] can still perform a standard man-in-the-middle attack by replacing one ephemeral value with a value of its choice, and can thus impersonate any entity in an undetectable way.
Here we introduce a certificateless key agreement protocol which is only vulnerable to such a man-in-the-middle attack if, in addition to replacing an ephemeral value, a user-specific long-term public key is also replaced. If keys are produced using our binding technique, then such a man-in-the-middle attack mounted by the KGC will leave evidence exposing the KGC's actions.
The initialization for our certificateless key agreement scheme is formally specified using five algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key. These are the same as in BasicCL-PKE.
Entities A and B who wish to agree a key first each choose random values a, b ∈ Z * q . Given these initializations, the protocol is as follows:
Protocol messages:
After the above messages are exchanged, both users check the validity of each other's public keys in the usual way (so A checks e(X B , P 0 ) = e(Y B , P ), etc.). Then A computes K A = e(Q B , Y B ) a · e(S A , T B ) and B computes e(Q A , Y A ) b · e(S B , T A ). It is easy to see that K = K A = K B is a key shared between A and B; to ensure forward security, A and B instead use the shared key H(K abP ) where H is a suitable hash function.
The protocol uses only two passes and is bandwidth-efficient. Bandwidth utilization can be reduced further if the same entities agree many keys: then transmission of only fresh T A , T B is needed in each protocol run. Each side computes four pairings; this can be reduced to one pairing each if the same entities agree many keys. The protocol is therefore competitive with those of [12, 33] . Key confirmation can be added with extra protocol passes.
Hierarchical CL-PKE
In [20] , Gentry and Silverberg improved the work of [24] by introducing a totally collusionresistant, hierarchical, ID-based infrastructure for encryption and signatures. Such an infrastructure spreads the workload of master servers and produces levels which can be used to support short lived keys, for example. However, the hierarchical schemes of [20] still have an undesirable escrow property. Here, we adapt the hierarchical encryption scheme of [20] to our certificateless setting and eliminate the key escrow.
In general, a hierarchical CL-PKE (HCL-PKE) scheme has a root KGC and a hierarchy of entities. Each entity other than the KGC is associated with a level t ≥ 1 in the hierarchy and with a string ID-tuple which identifies that entity's ancestors in the hierarchy. The ID-tuple string for an entity at level t with identity ID t is ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID t . An HCL-PKE scheme is specified by seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Encrypt and Decrypt. Rather than outline the general function of each algorithm, we present a concrete scheme, BasicHCL-PKE, whose description should make the general operation of an HCL-PKE scheme clear. The algorithms for BasicHCL-PKE are as follows.
Setup: This algorithm is identical to Setup for BasicCL-PKE, except that now the ciphertext space for a level t ciphertext is C t = G t 1 × {0, 1} n . The system parameters are params= G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 . For ease of presentation, we denote the master-key by x 0 instead of s (so we have P 0 = x 0 P ).
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm is usually executed by a level t − 1 entity ID t−1 for a child entity ID t at level t. When t = 1, this algorithm is executed by the root KGC for ID 1 . It takes as input the ID-tuple ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID t and carries out the following steps to construct the partial private key for ID t :
2. Output ID t 's partial private key D t where
The key D t must be transported to ID t over a confidential and authentic channel.
Set-Secret-value: This algorithm takes as inputs params and level t entity's ID-tuple ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID t as inputs. It selects x t ∈ Z * q at random and outputs x t as ID t 's secret value.
Set-Private-Key: As for BasicCL-PKE, except that the private key for ID t is denoted by S t . So S t = x t D t .
Set-Public-Key: As for BasicCL-PKE, except that the public key for ID t is denoted by
Encryption: To encrypt M ∈ M for identity ID t at level t ≥ 1 with ID-tuple ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID t , perform the following steps:
1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, check that the equality e(X i , P 0 ) = e(Y i , P ) holds. If any check fails, output ⊥ and abort encryption.
Compute
3. Choose a random r ∈ Z * q .
Compute and output the ciphertext:
Notice that to encrypt a message for a level t entity ID t , the values Q i and hence identities ID i of all the ancestors of ID t are needed.
Decryption: Suppose C = U 0 , U 2 , . . . , U t , V ∈ C t is a BasicHCL-PKE ciphertext for a level t entity with ID-tuple ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . ID t . Let the public keys of ID i 's ancestors be
Then to decrypt the ciphertext C using the private key S t , compute and output:
Using properties of the bilinear map e, we have:
so that decryption is the inverse of encryption. This completes our description of BasicHCL-PKE. It is straightforward to adapt this scheme as we did in building FullCL-PKE from BasicCL-PKE, to obtain a scheme that is secure against fully-adaptive chosen ciphertext attackers. We must assume here that no ancestor ID k of our level t entity ID t replaces the public key of ID t . Even with the extra binding step in place, our hierarchical schemes do not offer a true equivalent of trust level 3: although it is then possible to detect that a public key has been replaced by an ancestor, it is not possible to pinpoint exactly which ancestor is responsible. (Moreover, we cannot allow partial private keys to be made public in this setting as this would enable any adversary to mount a successful key attack by replacing the public key of ID t -finding this attack is left as an exercise for the reader.) We note that an extension of the hybrid PKI/ID-PKC scheme of [11] has stronger security guarantees. However, this approach still requires certification for intermediate entities, and our primary focus is on completely certificate-free infrastructures.
The CL-PKS scheme of Section 5.2 can also be adapted to produce a hierarchical, certificateless signature scheme.
Proxy Decryption
We demonstrate how our HCL-PKE scheme BasicHCL-PKE supports two kinds of proxy decryption: an entity A with identifier ID t at level t ≥ 1 can efficiently delegate decryption to either a proxy at level t − 1 (if t ≥ 2) or a proxy at level t + 1. This is an important feature because the decryption and encryption costs in our HCL-PKE scheme grow roughly linearly with t, so that an unacceptably high computational burden may be placed on entities located low in the hierarchy.
To prepare a ciphertext C = U 0 , U 2 , . . . , U t , V for proxy decryption, entity A with identifier ID t located at level t transforms C by appending some fixed keying information and a string proxy to it to obtain a new ciphertext:
Here, the value of proxy depends on whether decryption is being delegated to an entity at level t − 1 or t + 1. So we have two cases:
Proxy at level t − 1:
1. A sets proxy= x t U 0 and forwards C proxy to level t − 1 entity B with identifier ID t−1 .
B decrypts C proxy as follows:
Proxy at level t + 1:
1. A sets proxy= x t U 0 , e(x t Q t+1 , x t U 0 ) and forwards C proxy to level t + 1 entity B with identifier ID t+1 .
2. B decrypts C proxy as follows:
Notice that the proxy capability that A delegates is one-time only: in each of our two cases, to perform decryption, B needs a component x t U 0 that depends both on the ciphertext and on A's secret. Of course, our proxy schemes shield A's secret x t and private key S t from all entities, including the proxy. Notice also that the proxy ciphertext in our level t + 1 proxy scheme contains enough information allowing it to be decrypted by our level t − 1 proxy. So proxy ciphertexts produced for A's children can also be decrypted by A's parent.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced the concept of certificateless public key cryptography, a model for the use of public key cryptography that is intermediate between the identity-based approach and traditional PKI. We showed how our concept can be realized by specifying a certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme that is based on bilinear maps. The scheme enjoys short public and private keys. We showed that our CL-PKE scheme is secure in an appropriate model, assuming that the generalized Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP) is hard. We also rounded out our treatment by briefly presenting a number of other certificateless primitives: a signature scheme, key agreement protocol, a hierarchical encryption scheme and proxy decryption schemes.
In future work, we intend to develop security models and proofs for these other primitives. We fully expect that certificateless versions of yet more primitives can be devised by adapting existing identity-based schemes. A fruitful area of research may be special-purpose signature schemes [5, 8, 35] . Finally, we anticipate that pairings will give birth to further models for the use of public key cryptography. Our work and the recent work of [19] certainly point in this direction.
2. Choose a random r ∈ Z * q .
3. Set the ciphertext to be:
Decrypt: Let C = U, V ∈ C be the ciphertext. To decrypt C using private key S, compute:
It is easy to see that Decrypt is the inverse function to Encrypt.
HybridPub: This scheme is obtained by applying the hybridisation construction of [16] to BasicPub. Again, this scheme is specified by three algorithms: Key-Generation, Encrypt and Decrypt.
Key-Generation:
This algorithm is identical to that for BasicPub, except that we choose two additional hash functions H 3 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → Z * q and H 4 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Now the public key is G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . The private key is still S = xsQ, the message space is still M = {0, 1} n , but the ciphertext space is now C = G 1 × {0, 1} 2n .
Encrypt: To encrypt M ∈ M, perform the following steps:
1. Check that the equality e(X, P 0 ) = e(Y, P ) holds. If not, output ⊥ and abort encryption.
2. Choose a random σ ∈ {0, 1} n . 3. Set r = H 3 (σ, M ).
Compute and output the ciphertext:
Decrypt: To decrypt C = U, V, W ∈ C using private key S, do the following:
3. Set r ′ = H 3 (σ ′ , M ′ ) and test if U = r ′ P . If not, output ⊥ and reject the ciphertext.
A.2 Adversaries for BasicPub and HybridPub
Here we define adversaries appropriate to the schemes BasicPub and HybridPub, remembering that we want to model attackers who can replace public keys, or who may know the value s.
We recall the definition of OWE security for a standard public key encryption scheme from [6] : the adversary A is given a random public key K pub and a ciphertext C which is the encryption of a random message M under K pub . The adversary's goal is to recover M and A is said to have advantage ǫ in attacking the system if Pr[A(K pub , C) = M ] = ǫ. The adversary is called an OWE adversary.
We define A II to be a Type II OWE adversary against BasicPub if A II is an OWE adversary against BasicPub in the sense defined above, but is also in possession of the value s. We define a Type I OWE adversary A I against BasicPub as follows: A I is given a random public key K pub for BasicPub; A I then decides if it wishes to change the parameters X, Y in that public key to a valid pair X ′ , Y ′ of its choice. The (possibly new) public key K ′ pub is then used by the challenger to encrypt a random message M to produce a ciphertext C. Note that this ciphertext may be ⊥ , in which case the adversary has failed. The adversary's goal is to recover M ; A I is said to have advantage ǫ in attacking the system if Adv(A I ) := Pr[A I (K ′ pub , C) = M ] is equal to ǫ. Next we define IND-CPA and IND-CCA adversaries for HybridPub. A Type II IND-CCA adversary for HybridPub is simply the usual IND-CCA adversary against this public key encryption scheme, as defined in [4] , except that the adversary is also given the value s. 
A.3: Statements of Lemmas
We present a series of lemmas. 
where ǫ OWE (T, q ′ ) denotes the highest advantage of any Type I or Type II OWE adversary against BasicPub which operates in time T and makes q ′ hash queries to H 2 , and ǫ GBDHP (T ) denotes the highest advantage of any time T algorithm to solve GBDHP in groups of order q generated by IG. 
Here, we have used the fact that HybridPub is 1/q-uniform in the sense of [16, Definition 5].
Lemma 8
Suppose that H 2 is a random oracle. Suppose there exists a Type II OWE adversary A II against BasicPub which makes at most q 2 queries to H 2 and which has advantage ǫ. Then there exists an algorithm B to solve the BDHP which runs in time O(time(A II )) and has advantage at least (ǫ − 
A.4: Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2: This proof is complicated. It may be useful to read the proof of Lemma 6 and then return to this proof.
Let A I be a Type I IND-CCA adversary against FullCL-PKE. Suppose A I has advantage ǫ, runs in time t, makes q i queries to random oracle H i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) and makes q d decryption queries. We show how to construct from A I an adversary B that acts either as a Type I IND-CCA adversary against HybridPub or as a Type II IND-CCA adversary against HybridPub. We assume that challengers C I , C II for both types of game are available to B.
Adversary B begins by choosing a random bit c and an index I uniformly at random with 1 ≤ I ≤ q 1 . If c = 0, then B chooses to play against C I and aborts C II . Here, B will build a Type I IND-CPA adversary against HybridPub and fails against C II . When c = 1, B chooses to play against C II and aborts C I . Here, B will build a Type II IND-CPA adversary against HybridPub and fails against C I . In either case, C will denote the challenger against which B plays for the remainder of this proof.
We let H denote the event that A I chooses ID I as the challenge identity ID ch . We let F 0 denote the event that A I extracts the partial private key for entity ID I and F 1 denote the event that A I replaces the public key of entity ID I at some point in its attack.
The general strategy of the proof is as follows. If c = 0 and the event F 0 occurs, B will have to abort and will be unsuccessful. If F 0 does not occur, and if the event H does occur, then B's success probability will be related to that of A I . On the other hand, if c = 1 and event F 1 occurs, B will again have to abort and will be unsuccessful. If F 1 does not occur, but H does occur, then B's success probability will again be related to that of A I . Overall, we will show that B's advantage in its mixed-game strategy is non-negligible if A's is. It is then easy to see that B has a non-negligible advantage for at least one of the two game types. If c = 0, then C is a Type I challenger for HybridPub and begins by supplying B with a public key K pub = G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . If c = 1, then C is a Type II challenger and so supplies B with a public key K pub together with the value s such that P 0 = sP . Then B simulates the algorithm Setup of FullCL-PKE for A I by supplying A I with params= G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . Here H 1 is a random oracle that will be controlled by B.
Adversary A I may make queries of the random oracles H i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, at any time during its attack. These are handled as follows: H 1 queries: B maintains a list of tuples ID i , Q i , b i , x i , X i , Y i which we call the H 1 list. The list is initially empty, and when A I queries H 1 on input ID ∈ {0, 1} * , B responds as follows:
If ID does not already appear on the list and ID is the I-th distinct H 1 query made by A I , then B picks b I at random from Z * q , outputs H(ID) = b I Q and adds the entry ID, b I Q, b I , ⊥ , X, Y to the H 1 list.
3. Otherwise, when ID does not already appear on the list and ID is the i-th distinct H 1 query made by A I where i = I, B picks b i and x i at random from Z * q , outputs H(ID) = b i P and adds ID, b i P, b i , x i , x i P, x i P 0 to the H 1 list.
Notice that with this specification of H 1 , the FullCL-PKE partial private key for ID i (i = I) is equal to b i P 0 while the public key for ID i is x i P, x i P 0 and the private key for ID i is x i b i P 0 . These can all be computed by B when c = 0. Additionally, when c = 1 (so B has s), B can compute sb I Q, the partial private key of ID I . H 2 queries: Any H 2 queries made by A I are passed to C to answer. We do need to assume in the course of the proof that H 2 is a random oracle.
H 3 and H 4 queries: Adversary B passes A I 's H 3 and H 4 queries to C to answer, but keeps lists σ j , M j , H 3,j and σ ′ i , H 4,i of A I 's distinct queries and C's replies to them. Phase 1: After receiving params from B, A I launches Phase 1 of its attack, by making a series of requests, each of which is either a partial private key extraction for an entity, a private key extraction for an entity, a request for a public key for an entity, a replacement of a public key for an entity or a decryption query for an entity. We assume that A I always makes the appropriate H 1 query on the identity ID for that entity before making one of these requests. B replies to these requests as follows:
1. Find all triples σ j , M j , H 3,j on the H 3 list such that
Here, BasicCL-PKE-Encrypt ID A , X A ,Y A (M ; r) denotes the BasicCL-PKE encryption of message M for ID A using public key X A , Y A and random value r. Collect all these triples in a list S 1 . If S 1 is empty, output ⊥ and halt.
2. For each triple σ j , M j , H 3,j in S 1 , find all pairs σ ′ i , H 4,i in the H 4 list with σ j = σ ′ i . For each such match, place σ j , M j , H 3,j , H 4,i on a list S 2 . If S 2 is empty, then output ⊥ and halt.
3. Check in S 2 for an entry such that W = M j ⊕ H 4,i . If such an entry exists, then output M j as the decryption of U, V, W . Otherwise, output ⊥ .
We will show that KE correctly decrypts with high probability in Lemma 9.
Challenge Phase: At some point, A I should decide to end Phase 1 and pick ID ch and two messages m 0 , m 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. We can assume that ID ch has already been queried of H 1 but that A I has not extracted the private key for this identity. Algorithm B responds as follows. If ID ch = ID I then B aborts. Otherwise ID ch = ID I and B gives C the pair m 0 , m 1 as the messages on which it wishes to be challenged. C responds with the challenge ciphertext
It is easy to see that C * is the FullCL-PKE encryption of m b for identity ID I under public key X I , Y I . We let X ch , Y ch denote the particular value of the public key for identity ID ch during the challenge phase (A I may change this value in Phase 2 of its attack).
Phase 2: B continues to respond to A I 's requests in the same way as it did in Phase 1. However the usual restrictions on A I 's behaviour apply in this phase.
Guess: Eventually, A I should make a guess b ′ for b. Then B outputs b ′ as its guess for b. If A I has used more than time t, or attempts to make more than q i queries to random oracle H i or more than q d decryption queries, then B should abort A I and output a random guess for bit b (in this case algorithm KE has failed to perform correctly at some point).
Analysis: Now we analyze the behavior of B and A I in this simulation. We claim that if algorithm B does not abort during the simulation and if all of B's uses of the algorithm KE result in correct decryptions, then algorithm A I 's view is identical to its view in the real attack. Moreover, if this is the case, then 2(
2 ) ≥ ǫ. This is not hard to see: B's responses to all hash queries are uniformly and independently distributed as in the real attack. All responses to A I 's requests are valid, provided of course that B does not abort and that KE performs correctly. Furthermore, the challenge ciphertext C * is a valid FullCL-PKE encryption of m b under the current public key for identity ID ch , where b ∈ {0, 1} is random. Thus, by definition of algorithm A I we have that 2(
So we must examine the probability that B does not abort during the simulation given that the algorithm KE performs correctly. Examining the simulation, we see that B can abort for one of four reasons: 0. Because c = 0 and the event F 0 occurred during the simulation.
1. Because c = 1 and event F 1 occurred during the simulation.
2. Because A I made a private key extraction on ID I at some point.
Or because
We name the event (c = i) ∧ F i as H i for i = 0, 1. We also name the last two events here as F 2 and F 3 . Of course, F 3 is the same as event ¬H. Now A I makes q 1 queries of H 1 and chooses ID ch from amongst the responses ID i , while B's choice of I is made uniformly at random from the set of q 1 indices i. So the probability that ID ch = ID I is equal to 1/q 1 . Hence Pr[H] = 1/q 1 . Notice too that the event ¬F 3 implies the event ¬F 2 (if A I chooses ID ch = ID I , then no private key extraction on ID I is allowed). Gathering this information together, we have:
Notice now that the events H 0 and H 1 are mutually exclusive (because one involves c = 0 and the other c = 1). Therefore we have
where the last equality follows because the event F i |H is independent of the event c = i. So we have Pr[B does not abort] = 1
Finally, we have that Pr[F 0 ∧F 1 |H] = 0 because of the rules on adversary behaviour described in Section 3 (an adversary cannot both extract the partial private key and change the public key of the challenge identity Now we examine the probability that algorithm KE correctly handles all of A I 's q d decryption queries. We will show in Lemma 9 below that the probability that KE correctly replies to individual decryption queries is at least λ, where λ is bounded as in the statement of this lemma.
It is now easy to see that B's advantage is at least 
Lemma 9
In the simulation in the proof of Lemma 2, Algorithm KE correctly replies to individual decryption queries with probability at least λ where
Here t is the running time of adversary A I , t ′ is the running time of the BasicCL-PKE encryption algorithm, ǫ OWE (T, q ′ ) denotes the highest advantage of any Type I or Type II OWE adversary against BasicPub which operates in time T and makes q ′ hash queries to H 2 , and ǫ GBDHP (T ) denotes the highest advantage of any algorithm to solve GBDHP in time T in groups of order q generated by IG.
Proof of Lemma 9: Our proof is closely modelled on the proof of [16, Lemma 11] , but differs in several key respects: we need to build an algorithm which handles multiple public keys, and the algorithm can be asked to decrypt the challenge ciphertext (but under a different identity/public key combination from the challenge identity).
We recall that queries to KE come in the form of a ciphertext C = U, V, W , an identity ID ℓ and the current value of the public key X ℓ , Y ℓ for that identity. We also assume that KE has access to the H 3 and H 4 lists as they stand at the point where the decryption query is made. We model the fact that A I obtains a challenge ciphertext by considering an additional list of ciphertexts Y in our proof. This list is empty until the challenge phase and thereafter consists of just the challenge ciphertext C * = U * , V * , W * . The proof of [16, Lemma 11] generalises this to larger sets Y, but this special case is sufficient for our purposes.
We define a sequence of events:
• Inv is the event that there exists some C ′ = U ′ , V ′ , W ′ ∈ Y and some σ j , M j , H 3,j on the H 3 list or some σ ′ i , H 4,i on the H 4 list such that the BasicCL-PKE decryption of U ′ , V ′ under the private key corresponding to ID ch , X ch , Y ch is equal to σ j or σ ′ i . (For us, Inv has zero probability until after a non-abortive challenge phase in A I 's attack because Y is empty up to this point.)
• L 1 is the event that S 1 is non-empty.
• L 2 is the event that S 2 is non-empty.
• Find is the event that there exists an entry
• Fail is the event that the output of algorithm KE is not the decryption of C under the private key corresponding to identity ID ℓ and public key X ℓ , Y ℓ .
We want to bound the probability of the event Fail. To do so, we follow the proof of [16, Lemma 11] and define combined events: We proceed to bound each of the terms in the above inequality.
. Here ǫ OWE (T, q ′ ) denotes the highest advantage of any Type I or Type II OWE adversary against BasicPub which operates in time T and makes q ′ hash queries to H 2 , while time(B) denotes the running time of adversary B in the proof of Lemma 2.
We sketch how to construct an OWE adversary B ′ against BasicPub by adapting adversary B in the proof of Lemma 2. Our adversary B ′ will have a chance of being successful provided that the event Inv occurs in the course of A I 's attack. When c = 0, B ′ will be of Type I, and when c = 1, of Type II. The running time of the adversary will be the same as that of B. The existence of this adversary will be used to bound the probability of the event Inv.
In fact B ′ is almost identical to B. The only differences are that B ′ is given by its challenger C ′ a BasicPub public key G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 (and the value s when c = 1), that B ′ now answers A I 's H 3 and H 4 queries for itself (keeping lists of all queries made by A I and its own replies), and that B ′ responds to A I 's request for a challenge ciphertext with C * = b −1 I U ′ , V ′ , W * where U ′ , V ′ is a BasicPub challenge ciphertext given to B ′ by C ′ and W * is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} n . Notice too that if A I changes the key of ID I , then B ′ relays the appropriate changes to C ′ , and that B ′ uses the algorithm KE to handle A I 's decryption queries (so the responses may be incorrect).
Eventually A I outputs a bit b ′ . If necessary (when A I runs for too long or makes too many hash queries), B ′ stops A I . Note that B ′ may also be forced to stop because it cannot respond to a particular query from A I . After stopping for whatever reason, B ′ chooses a random value σ from amongst the σ j on the H 3 list and the σ ′ i on the H 4 list and outputs this random choice.
It can be argued that, up to the point where Inv occurs in B ′ 's simulation, the two simulations B and B ′ are indistinguishable to A I . So the probability that Inv occurs in B ′ 's simulation is exactly the same that it does in B's. Because of the relationship between the BasicPub and FullCL-PKE public keys, it can also be seen that if event Inv occurs, then B ′ has probability 1/(q 3 +q 4 ) of outputting the correct BasicPub decryption of U ′ , V ′ . Here we are using the fact that if Inv occurs, then Y is non-empty, so that we must have ID ch = ID I . So B ′ 's overall success probability is at least Pr[Inv]/(q 3 + q 4 ). But this is not greater than the highest success probability of any OWE adversary of Type I or II against BasicPub that operates in the same time as B ′ and that makes q 2 hash queries. Since the running time of B ′ is the same as that of B, the claim follows.
Claim: Pr[Fail|00] ≤ 2/q + 2 −n + ǫ GBDHP (time(B)). Here ǫ GBDHP (T ) denotes the highest advantage of any algorithm to solve GBDHP in time T in groups generated by IG.
We analyse the event Fail|00 as follows. Here KE outputs ⊥ because S 1 is empty, but this is an incorrect decryption. So in fact there exists a message M such that C = U, V, W encrypts M under ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ . It is easy to see that, because U, V is a valid BasicCL-PKE ciphertext for ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ , there exist unique σ ∈ {0, 1} n and r ∈ Z * q such that:
Since S 1 is empty, we deduce that H 3 has not been queried on an input containing σ.
We consider two cases: either a valid C = C * has been produced by A I from a message M using coins r = H 3 (σ, M ) without σ having been queried of H 3 , or in fact C = C * and this query occurs after the challenge phase. In the former case, it is easy to see that C will be a valid ciphertext with probability at most 1/q, because a valid ciphertext C = U, V, W will have U = rP where r ∈ Z * q is the output of random oracle H 3 on a query not made by A I .
We consider the latter case, where C = C * is a valid ciphertext, further. Now KE can only ever be queried on this ciphertext for a combination of identity and public key ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ not equal to ID ch , X ch , Y ch because of the rules on adversary behaviour. We also know that ID ch = ID I (because to receive this query, B must not have aborted at the challenge phase). Suppose then that
where r * = H 3 (σ * , m b ) and, as usual, X ch , Y ch denotes the value of ID ch 's public key at the time when the challenge ciphertext was computed. The values σ * , H 4 (σ * ) and r * are unknown to B and KE (since B's challenger produces C * ). Since C = C * , we have rP = U = U * = r * P and so r = r * . The probability that σ = σ * is 1/q. For suppose that σ = σ * . Then we have H 3 (σ, M ) = r = r * = H 3 (σ * , m b ), giving equal outputs for random oracle H 3 from distinct inputs. The probability of this event is 1/q. So with probability 1 − 1/q, we have σ = σ * . But then we must have
If these inputs to H 2 are unequal then we have a collision of the random oracle H 2 , an event of probability 2 −n . So with probability 1 − 2 −n , we have Given this analysis, we sketch how to construct an algorithm B ′ that, with high probability, solves random instances of GBDHP in groups generated by IG, so long as the event Fail|00 occurs. Our algorithm B ′ is almost identical to B. Suppose B ′ is tasked with solving the BDHP or GBDHP on input P, f P, gP, hP in G 1 , G 2 , e .
Recall that B selects a random bit c and then requests a HybridPub public key from C. Instead, B ′ creates its own public key. When c = 0, B ′ chooses x at random from Z * q and sets K pub = G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 = f P, X = xP, Y = xP 0 , Q = gP, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . When c = 1, B ′ chooses s at random from Z * q and sets K pub = G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 = sP, X = f P, Y = sf P, Q = gP, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . The only other difference to B's simulation is that B ′ needs to carry out those tasks which B formerly passed on to C. These are: responding to H 3 and H 4 queries; tracking any changes to K pub ; and creating a HybridPub challenge ciphertext. These are all dealt with in the obvious way.
It is clear that B ′ 's simulation is indistinguishable from that of B, so the probability that the event Fail|00 occurs in B ′ 's simulation is the same as in B's. But when this event does occur and C = C * , then our analysis above shows that the equality e(P, Y ℓ ) = e(Q, sX ch )
for ℓ = I holds with probability (1 − q −1 )(1 − 2 −n ). Here s = f when c = 0 and s is the value chosen at random by B ′ when c = 1. In the case c = 0, we see that
is a solution to the GBDHP for input P, f P, gP, hP . When c = 1, we know that A I has not changed the values X ch = X, Y ch = Y at any point in its attack (otherwise B ′ would have aborted). Then we have e(P, Y ℓ ) = e(Q, X)
is a solution to the GBDHP for input P, f P, gP, hP . (Note that here we actually have a solution to the BDHP.) In either case, B ′ can compute the appropriate solution simply by waiting for A I to make a decryption query on C = C * . If A I does not make such a query in the course of its attack, then B ′ outputs a random guess for the solution to the GBDHP. The result is an algorithm that solves GBDHP in groups generated by IG, runs in time bounded by time(B) and is almost always successful when C = C * and the event Fail|00 occurs. Any such algorithm has success probability at most ǫ GBDHP (time(B)).
A straightforward probability analysis of the events in the above discussion now shows that:
The claim follows.
Claim: Pr[Fail|010] = 2 −n . In this situation, KE outputs ⊥ because S 2 is empty, but this is an incorrect decryption. So in fact there exists a message M such that C = U, V, W encrypts M under ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ . Now it is easy to see that, because U, V is a valid BasicCL-PKE ciphertext for ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ , there exist unique σ ∈ {0, 1} n and r ∈ Z * q such that:
But S 1 is non-empty, so we also have:
for some j. This implies that σ = σ j and r = H 3,j . Since S 2 is empty, we can deduce that H 4 has not been queried at σ. Yet we must have W = M ⊕ H 4 (σ) if C is a proper encryption of M . The probability of this event occurring is exactly 2 −n and this bounds the probability that KE incorrectly outputs ⊥ .
Claim: Pr[Fail|0110] = 1/q. Here KE outputs ⊥ because a failure occurs at step 3 , but this is an incorrect decryption. Arguing as in the previous claim, we deduce that there exists a message M such that C = U, V, W encrypts M under ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ , using unique σ ∈ {0, 1} n and r ∈ Z * q . Moreover, there exists a j with σ = σ j and r = H 3,j . Now S 2 is non-empty, so there exists an entry σ j , M j , H 3,j , H 4,i on the S 2 list with σ ′ i = σ j = σ. Now suppose that σ, M has been queried of H 3 . Then we would also have an entry σ, M, H 3,j , H 4,i on the S 2 list. But since C is the encryption of M , we would also have W = M ⊕ H 4,i . Then KE would output M instead of ⊥ . This contradiction shows that σ, M has not been queried of H 3 . Yet we must have H 3 (σ, M ) = r = H 3,j if C is a proper encryption of M . The probability of this event occurring is exactly 1/q and this bounds the probability that KE incorrectly outputs ⊥ . Notice that this argument can be used to correct a small flaw in the corresponding part of the proof of [16, Lemma 11] .
Claim: Pr[Fail|0111] = 0. Here, KE outputs a message M j whose encryption under the combination ID ℓ , X ℓ , Y ℓ yields the ciphertext C with random oracles H 3 and H 4 as defined in B's simulation. Therefore the decryption of C is M j , and KE never fails in this situation. The claim follows.
Gathering together each of these claims, we finally obtain
The running time of B is time(A I )+q d ·time(KE) = t+O((q 3 +q 4 )q d t ′ ), where t ′ is the running time of the BasicCL-PKE encryption algorithm. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Let A I be a Type I IND-CPA adversary against HybridPub which has advantage ǫ, runs in time t and makes q 4 queries to H 4 . We construct a Type I OWE adversary B against BasicPub. Let C denote a challenger against such a B. C begins by supplying B with a public key G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 . Algorithm B creates from this a public key K pub = G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 for HybridPub and delivers it to A I . Here, H 3 and H 4 will be random oracles under the control of B.
Now A I begins Phase 1 of its attack. During this phase, B records any changes that A I makes to the public key components X, Y . B handles A I 's H 3 and H 4 queries using lists as follows. To respond to an H 3 query on input σ, M ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n , B first checks if σ = σ j and M = M j for some index j corresponding to an entry σ j , M j , H 3,j already on the H 3 list. If it is, then B responds with H 3,j . Otherwise, B chooses H uniformly at random from Z * q and places σ, M, H on the H 3 list. Likewise, to respond to an H 4 query on input σ ∈ {0, 1} n , B first checks if σ = σ ′ i for some index i corresponding to an entry σ ′ i , H 4,i already on the H 4 list. If it is, then B responds with H 4,i . Otherwise, B chooses H uniformly at random from {0, 1} n and places σ, H on the H 4 list.
Eventually A I outputs a pair of messages m 0 , m 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. If A I has changed the public key components X, Y , then B passes these changes to C (recall that B is of Type I, so is entitled to change these components before receiving its challenge ciphertext). Then B requests of C a BasicPub ciphertext C ′ = U ′ , V ′ . This challenge ciphertext will be the encryption of some message σ * using the current value of the public key, and it is B's task to recover σ * .
Adversary B now chooses a random W * ∈ {0, 1} n , sets C * = U ′ , V ′ , W * and delivers C * to A I as the HybridPub challenge ciphertext. Notice that B's simulation is indistinguishable from A I 's view in a real attack, up to at least the point where H occurs. Therefore the probability that H occurs in B's simulation is exactly the same as in a real attack and so is at least ǫ/2. But if H occurs, then B's probability of success is at least 1/(q ′ 3 + q ′ 4 ) ≥ 1/(q 3 + q 4 ), because B outputs a random choice from the list of H 3 and H 4 queries and at least one of these is equal to σ * when H occurs. Hence B's probability of success is at least ǫ/2(q 3 + q 4 ). Notice that the running time of B is of the same order as that of A I . This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4:
The proof of this lemma is almost identical to that of Lemma 3 and is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let A I be a Type I OWE adversary against BasicPub who makes at most q 2 queries to random oracle H 2 and who has advantage ǫ. We show how to construct an algorithm B which interacts with A I to solve the GBDHP.
Suppose B has as inputs G 1 , G 2 , e and P, aP, bP, cP (where a, b, c ∈ Z * q are unknown to B). Let D = e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 denote the solution to the BDHP on these inputs. Algorithm B creates a public key G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 for A I by taking x ∈ Z * q at random, setting P 0 = aP , X = xP , Y = xP 0 and Q = bP . B then gives this key to A I . A I may choose to reset the pair X, Y to another pair X ′ , Y ′ . B then checks if the public key satisfies e(X ′ , P 0 ) = e(Y ′ , P ). If not, then B outputs ⊥ and stops the simulation. In this event, A I has failed. Otherwise, B sets U = cP , chooses V randomly from {0, 1} n , and gives A I the challenge ciphertext C = U, V .
Notice that if ⊥ is not output, then the public key must have components X ′ = x ′ P, Y ′ = x ′ aP for some x ′ , and the corresponding (unknown) private key is x ′ abP . Then the (unknown) decryption of C is M = V ⊕ H 2 (e(P, x ′ P ) abc ) = V ⊕ H 2 (D x ′ ). Hence a solution X ′ , D x ′ to the GBDHP can be derived from examining A I 's choice of public key and H 2 queries.
To simulate H 2 queries by A I , B maintains a list of pairs Z j , H 2,j . To respond to an H 2 query Z, B first checks if Z = Z j for some Z j already on the list. If it is, then B responds with H 2,j . Otherwise, B chooses H uniformly at random from {0, 1} n and places Z, H on the H 2 list.
Eventually, A I will output its guess M ′ for the decryption of C. Now B chooses a random pair Z j , H 2,j from the H 2 list and outputs the pair X ′ , Z j as the solution to the GBDHP. (If the list is empty, B just outputs a random pair from G 1 × G 2 .)
It is easy to see that A I 's view in B's simulation is the same as in a real attack. So A I 's advantage in this simulation will be ǫ. We let H be the event that D x ′ is queried of H 2 during B's simulation and R denote the event that A I 's choice of public key components X ′ , Y ′ passes the test (so ⊥ is not output). We let δ denote the probability that event H occurs. Rearranging, we see that δ ≥ ǫ − 1 2 n . Since B's output is of the form X ′ , Z j with Z j chosen randomly from the H 2 list, we see that B's success probability is at least δ/q 2 . The lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let A II be a Type II IND-CCA adversary against FullCL-PKE. Suppose A II has advantage ǫ and makes q 1 queries to random oracle H 1 . We show how to construct from A II a Type II IND-CCA adversary B against HybridPub. The construction is similar to the one used in the proof of [6, Lemma 4.6 ] .
Let C denote the challenger against our IND-CCA adversary B for HybridPub. C begins by supplying B with a public key K pub = G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 and the value s such that P 0 = sP . Adversary B mounts an IND-CCA attack on the key K pub using help from A II as follows.
First of all B chooses an index I with 1 ≤ I ≤ q 1 . Then B simulates the algorithm Setup of FullCL-PKE for A II by supplying A II with params= G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 and the value s as master-key. Here H 1 is a random oracle controlled by B.
Phase 1: Now A II launches Phase 1 of its attack, by making a series of requests, each of which is either a private key extraction, a request for a public key for a particular entity, or a decryption query. (Recall that a Type II adversary cannot replace public keys and can make partial private key extraction queries for himself given s.) We assume that A II always makes the appropriate H 1 query on ID before making one of these requests for that identity. B replies to these requests as follows:
Private Key Extraction: If the request is on ID I then B aborts. Otherwise, if the request is on ID i with i = I, then B outputs x i sQ i .
Request for Public Key: If the request is on ID I then B returns X, Y . Otherwise, if the request is on ID i for some i with i = I, then B returns x i P, x i sP .
Decryption Queries: If the request is to decrypt U, V, W under the private key for ID I , then B relays the decryption query b I U, V, W to C. It is easy to see that the FullCL-PKE decryption of U, V, W under the (unknown) private key for ID I is equal to the HybridPub decryption of b I U, V, W under the (unknown) private key corresponding to K pub . Hence C's response to B's request can be relayed to A II . On the other hand, if the request is to decrypt U, V, W under the private key for ID i (i = I), then B can perform this decryption himself using the private key x i sb i P for ID i .
Challenge Phase: At some point, A II decides to end Phase 1 and picks ID ch and two messages M 0 , M 1 on which it wants to be challenged. We can assume that ID ch has already been queried of H 1 but that A II has not extracted the private key for this identity. Algorithm B responds as follows. If ID ch = ID I then B aborts. Otherwise ID ch = ID I and B gives C the pair M 0 , M 1 as the messages on which it wishes to be challenged. C responds with the challenge ciphertext C ′ = U ′ , V ′ , W ′ , such that C ′ is the HybridPub encryption of M b under K pub for a random b ∈ {0, 1}. Then B sets C * = b −1 I U ′ , V ′ , W ′ and delivers C * to A II . It is not hard to see that C * is the FullCL-PKE encryption of M b for identity ID I (with public key X, Y ).
Phase 2: B continues to respond to requests in the same way as it did in Phase 1. Of course, we now restrict A II to not make private key extraction requests on ID ch . If any decryption query relayed to C is equal to the challenge ciphertext C ′ then B aborts. 2 ) ≥ ǫ. The probability that B does not abort during the simulation remains to be calculated. Examining the simulation, we see that B can abort for three reasons: (1) because A II made a private key extraction on ID I at some point, (2) because A II did not choose ID ch = ID I , or (3) because B relayed a decryption query on C ′ = U ′ , V ′ , W ′ to C in Phase 2.
Because of the way that B converts ciphertexts, this last event happens only if A II queries B on the ciphertext C * = b where the last equality follows from B's random choice of I being independent of A II 's choice of ID ch .
Thus we see that B's advantage is at least ǫ/q 1 and the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 8:
Let A II be a Type II OWE adversary against BasicPub who makes at most q 2 queries to random oracle H 2 and who has advantage ǫ. We show how to construct an algorithm B which interacts with A II to solve the BDHP.
Suppose B has as inputs G 1 , G 2 , e and P, aP, bP, cP (where a, b, c ∈ Z * q are unknown to B). Let D = e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 denote the solution to the BDHP on these inputs. Algorithm B creates a public key G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 0 , X, Y, Q, H 2 for A II by taking s ∈ Z * q at random, setting P 0 = sP , X = aP , Y = saP and Q = bP . B then gives this public key and s to A II . B now sets U = cP , chooses V randomly from {0, 1} n , and gives A II the challenge ciphertext C = U, V .
Notice that the (unknown) private key is now absP and the (unknown) decryption of C is M = V ⊕ H 2 (D s ). Hence the solution D to the BDHP can be derived from examining A II 's H 2 queries.
To simulate H 2 queries by A II , B acts exactly as in the proof of Lemma 5.
Eventually, A II will output its guess M ′ for the decryption of C. Now B chooses a random pair Z j , H 2,j from the H 2 list and outputs Z s −1 mod q j ∈ G 2 as the solution to the BDHP. (If the list is empty, B just outputs a random element of G 2 .)
It is easy to see that A II 's view in B's simulation is the same as in a real attack. So A II 's advantage in this simulation will be ǫ. We let H be the event that D s is queried of H 2 during B's simulation and let δ denote the probability that event H occurs. Now where we have used the fact that if H does not occur, then H 2 has not been queried on input D s , so that A II 's view must be independent of the value of M .
Rearranging, we see that δ ≥ ǫ − 1 2 n . Since B's output is of the form Z s −1 mod q j with Z j chosen randomly from the H 2 list, we see that B's success probability is at least δ/q 2 . The lemma follows.
